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Abstract
We investigate a model of deterministic stochastic choice for the standard con-
sumer problem. We introduce the framework of statistical consumer theory where
the individual maximizes their utility with respect to a distribution of bundles that
is constrained by a statistic (e.g. mean expenditure). We show that this behavior
is observationally equivalent to an individual whose preferences depend only on the
statistic of the distribution. Statistical consumer theory neither nests nor is nested
in the random utility approach. We provide a formal statistical test of the model
accounting for sampling variability and demonstrate it in an illustrative example
using data on capuchin monkeys.
∗We thank Keith Chen for providing access to the data.
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1 Introduction
Stochastic choice occurs when an individual faces a budget set several times and pro-
duces a distribution of choices from that budget set. In economics, a large literature has
emerged to understand stochastic choice. There are two main approaches. The first one
assumes that stochastic choices are generated by random preference shocks. This led to
the development of random utility models (RUMs).1 The second approach assumes that
stochastic choices are generated by an individual who chooses a most-preferred distribu-
tion of bundles and randomizes according to that distribution. Following the literature,
we call this approach deterministic stochastic choice, since individuals have a determin-
istic preference over the distributions of commodity bundles.2 In this paper, we examine
deterministic stochastic choice for the standard consumer problem when an individual
maximizes their utility with respect to distributions over consumption bundles that are
constrained by a statistic. We call this framework a statistical choice model. We show
that these restrictions are equivalent to a model where the individual’s preferences depend
only on the statistic that constrains the distributions.
Within the paper, we focus on restrictions from the mean statistic. We are interested
in the case where an individual faces budget restrictions that depend on mean expen-
diture, however the ideas readily extend to other statistics. We consider the standard
consumer problem where an individual can choose a distribution of consumption bun-
dles, but faces a budget constraint that mean expenditure is less than income. The main
result (Theorem 1) shows that an individual makes choices consistent with the constraint
on mean expenditures if and only if the generalized axiom of revealed preference (Afriat,
1967; Diewert, 1973; Varian, 1982) is satisfied on mean consumption bundles. This result
follows while only assuming local nonsatiation of the preference over distributions.
The main result also shows that when the budget constraints depend only on mean
expenditure, it is equivalent to assume an individual (i) has a nonsatiated preference over
all distributions, or (ii) has preferences that depend only on mean consumption. More
1Random utility models are studied in Thurstone (1927), Luce (1959), Block and Marschak (1960),
Falmagne (1978), McFadden and Richter (1990), McFadden (2005), and Kitamura and Stoye (2018).
2An early paper to consider this perspective is Machina (1985). For a more recent work in this
framework see Swait and Marley (2013), Fudenberg et al. (2015), Freer and Martinelli (2016), Cerreia-
Vioglio et al. (2019), and Allen and Rehbeck (2019).
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generally, if there are systematic budgetary restrictions from a statistic of the distribu-
tions, then one can model individual behavior as arising from preferences that depend
only on the statistic. After stating the main result, we show through examples that this
framework neither nests nor is nested by random utility models.
The model of statistical consumer theory we present has intuitive appeal. A natu-
ral starting point when considering an individual choosing a distribution of bundles is
to consider what constraints are placed on the distributions that can be chosen. Con-
straints on the distributions by a statistic (e.g. mean) may occur by necessity since an
individual cannot overspend their income indefinitely. These constraints may also occur
via mental accounting (Thaler, 1980) where an individual allows themselves to purchase
bundles beyond their income (e.g. vacation), but does not allow these regularly. Using a
statistic may be easier for an individual performing mental accounting since it is a lower
dimensional object than the whole distribution.
Statistical consumer theory also provides a new perspective for models of stochastic
choice. As mentioned earlier, there are many papers that study stochastic choice. The
approach of random utility models (McFadden and Richter, 1990) is often criticized since
it is difficult to apply it to welfare analysis because an individual’s distribution of pref-
erences is in general not uniquely identified.3 In contrast, when stochastic choices are
generated from a preference over distributions following Machina (1985), a researcher can
use the standard welfare framework of consumer theory. This paper provides a bridge
that allows a researcher to use the ideas of standard consumer theory to study stochastic
choice, since natural statistics such as the mean lead to an analogue of the generalized
axiom of revealed preference.
This paper also provides theory that matches the analysis used in experiments on
animal decision making following the work of Kagel et al. (1975), Battalio et al. (1981),
Kagel et al. (1981), Battalio et al. (1985), and Kagel et al. (1995).4 Since researchers
performing experiments on economic rationality of animals are not able to explain the
3This need not be true if one restricts the class of preferences. For example, the single-crossing random
utility models in Apesteguia et al. (2017) yield point identification on distributions of preferences.
4There are other papers that study rationality of animals. For example, Shafir (1994), Chen et al.
(2006), Latty and Beekman (2010), Lea and Ryan (2015), Krasheninnikova et al. (2018), and Natenzon
(2019) study rationality properties of choice distributions from bees, capuchin monkeys, amoeboids, frogs,
and parrots.
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directions to their subjects, these studies are concerned about noise being present from
a single choice. For these reasons, rationality of animals is mainly tested using mean
choices. While the test of mean rationality is standard in such experiments, it does not
follow from any standard revealed preference result. This paper fills this gap.5
Following the theory, we provide a simple statistical framework for testing rationality
using mean choices. Many experiments examining rationality in animals look at choices
from two linear budget sets. These experiments are often designed so that a violation of
rationality can only be detected when there is a violation of downward-sloping demand
in consumption-compensated budget sets. We present a method to test for violations of
mean rationality for any two budget sets. In particular, our test can be used for budget
sets that are not consumption-compensated. We illustrate how to to perform the test
using data on capuchin monkeys from Chen et al. (2006).
This paper also informs work on revealed preference which is discussed in a textbook
setting in Chambers and Echenique (2016). In particular, we build off the standard
demand setting studied in Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973), and Varian (1982). To the best
of our knowledge, the idea of considering how revealed preference restrictions from budget
constraints are related to the objective function of the individual is new. However, the
results are mathematically similar to those developed in Forges and Minelli (2009). The
approach is also related to Richter (1979), Chambers et al. (2019), and Deb et al. (2019),
which examine the relation between primal and dual revealed preference relations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the model
with constraints on mean expenditure and presents the main results. Section 3 contrasts
behavior of statistical consumer theory with random utility models. Section 4 presents the
results on the statistical methods for common budgets used in tests of mean rationality
for animals and provides an illustrative example using data from Chen et al. (2006).
Section 5 provides a discussion of the results and some final remarks.
5In contrast, experiments on human often use a single choice from each budget, e.g. Harbaugh et al.
(2001), Andreoni and Miller (2002), Choi et al. (2007). Nonetheless, a researcher may be concerned that
a human does not understand instructions and be interested in examining mean rationality.
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2 Model and results
In this section, we present a model of consumer choice where the individual maximizes
their utility over a distribution of consumption bundles, but faces a restriction on mean
expenditure. We discuss how this extends to general statistics in Appendix A. All proofs
not found in the main text are located in Appendix A.
We identify the consumption space with the positive orthant of the L-dimensional
real space RL+. Hence, a consumption bundle is a vector x ∈ RL+, where for ℓ = 1, . . . , L
each entry xℓ determines the amount of one of the L commodities. We endow RL+ with a
norm ∥ · ∥ and the natural product order ≥.6 Let ∆ denote the space of Borel probability
measures over the consumption space RL+. For technical reasons, we restrict our attention
to measures that satisfy
∫
∥y∥dµ(y) < ∞, which is without loss of generality in this
framework.7 Finally, we endow ∆ with the weak topology.8
We consider a model of consumer choice in which an individual maximizes their util-
ity function with respect to probability distributions over the consumption space. Thus,
stochastic choice is generated by an agent who chooses a most-preferred distribution of
bundles and randomizes the selection of a particular bundle in RL+ according to this dis-
tribution. See Sopher and Narramore (2000), Agranov and Ortoleva (2017), and Feldman
and Rehbeck (2019) for experimental evidence supporting this view of stochastic choice.
The primitive dataset D :=
{
(pt,mt, µt) : t ∈ T
}
consists of a finite number of prices
pt ∈ RL++, incomes mt ∈ R++, and probability measures µt ∈ ∆. Here, we interpret the
probability measure µt as being chosen by a single consumer. We abuse notation and
use T both to refer to the number of observations and the set of their labels, where the
meaning is clear from the context. Later in the paper, we show that one may assume
mt =
∫
(pt · y)dµt(y) without loss of generality for statistical consumer theory.
6This is to say that, for any vectors x = (xℓ)
L
ℓ=1, y = (yℓ)
L
ℓ=1 in RL, we have x ≥ y if xℓ ≥ yℓ, for all
ℓ = 1, . . . , L. In addition, the relation is strict and denoted by x > y if x ≥ y and x ̸= y.
7Equivalently, the Bochner integral
∫
y dµ(y) in RL+ is well-defined. This follows from Theorem 11.44
in Aliprantis and Border (2006).
8A sequence {νk} in ∆ weakly converges to ν if the Lebesgue integral
∫
fdνk converges to
∫
fdν, for
any continuous and bounded function f : RL+ → R. In particular, this space is metrizable.
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2.1 Statistical consumer theory
The focus of this paper is on a case of statistical consumer theory where the set of feasible
distributions is constrained by mean expenditure, given the observed prices. Specifically,
given prices p ∈ RL++ and income m > 0, a feasible distribution ν must be contained in
the mean expenditure budget defined by the mapping
A(p,m) =
{
ν ∈ ∆ :
∫
(p · y)dν(y) ≤ m
}
. (1)
The mean expenditure budget allows an individual to purchase bundles that cost more or
less than their income. However, on average the expenditure can not exceed the income.
Following the interpretation of deterministic stochastic choice, the individual selects a
distribution µ to maximize their utility over the budget A(p,m).
With this restriction, we consider mean expenditure datasets of the form DA :={
(At, µt) : t ∈ T
}
where At := A(pt,mt) and µt ∈ At. Throughout the theoretical
analysis, we assume there is no error in measuring the chosen distribution µt. However,
when applying these results to certain empirical settings, sampling variability may arise
since only finitely many realizations of µt can be observed. These realizations would be
interpreted as “choices” in a standard deterministic or random utility model. In contrast,
for our approach, preferences are defined over distributions µt and the realizations are
drawn from the chosen distributions. We discuss methods to address finite sample issues
in Section 4.
We are interested in when the dataset DA can be described, or rationalized, by utility
maximization. Equivalently, we wish to know when there exists a utility function U :
∆ → R such that for all t ∈ T , the chosen distribution µt satisfies
U(µt) ≥ U(ν), for all ν ∈ At. (2)
Clearly, with no additional restriction on the utility function, any dataset can be ratio-
nalized with a constant function U . For this reason, we restrict our attention to the
class of locally nonsatiated utility functions U . Local nonsatiation of U requires that, for
any probability measure ν ∈ ∆ and neighborhood, there is some distribution ν ′ in the
neighborhood that satisfies U(ν ′) > U(ν).
The above framework allows for a natural definition of revealed preference relations.
We begin by specifying the directly revealed preference relation R defined over the set of
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observed choices {µt}t∈T . For any t, s ∈ T , we say that measure µt is directly revealed
preferred to µs, and denote it by µt R µs, when
∫
(pt · y)dµs(y) ≤ mt; i.e., whenever the
measure µs was available from the budget At. Next, we define the strictly directly revealed
preference relation P . For any t, s ∈ T , we say that measure µt is strictly directly revealed
preferred to µs, and denote it by µt P µs, when
∫
(pt · y)dµs(y) < mt.
It is straightforward to show that both relations are consistent with any locally non-
satiated utility function U that rationalizes the set of observations DA. Indeed, whenever
the consumer selects a measure µt at time t, they directly reveal that it is preferable to
any other option µs that satisfies the mean expenditure constraint
∫
(pt · y)dµs(y) ≤ mt.
Hence, µt R µs must imply U(µt) ≥ U(µs).
One can show that the strict directly revealed preference P is also consistent with a
locally nonsatiated utility. First, recall that local nonsatiation of U requires that for any
element ν ∈ ∆ and neighborhood, there is some ν ′ in the neighborhood such that U(ν ′) >
U(ν). By continuity of function ν →
∫
(pt·y)dν(y), the set
{
ν ∈ ∆ :
∫
(pt·y)dν(y) < mt
}
is
open. Therefore, for any element µs contained in the set, there must be some distribution
ν ′ such that U(ν ′) > U(µs). Since ν ′ is also available from the At budget, the previous
claim implies U(µt) ≥ U(ν ′) > U(µs).
Now we construct the revealed preference relation R∗ from the previous direct revealed
preference relations. Specifically, for any t, s ∈ T , we say that µt is revealed preferred to
µs, denoted by µt R∗ µs, if there is a sequence of indices a, b, c, . . . , z ∈ T such that
µt R µa, µa R µb, . . . , and µz R µs. (3)
Moreover, we say that µt is strictly revealed preferred to µs, denoted by µt P ∗ µs, when
there is a sequence as in (3) with at least one pair strictly revealed preferred. This
immediately implies the testable restriction of mean acyclicity.
Definition 1 (Mean acyclicity). For any cycle C =
{
(a, b), (b, c), . . . , (z, a)
}
in T × T
such that
∫
(pt · y)dµs(y) ≤ mt for (t, s) ∈ C, we have
∫
(pt · y)dµs(y) = mt, for (t, s) ∈ C.
The definition of mean acyclicity depends only on the information contained in the
primitive dataset, but it is equivalent to restrictions on the revealed preference relations.
Indeed, it is satisfied if and only of the revealed strict preference relation P ∗ is irreflexive.9
9The relation P ∗ is irreflexive if not µ P ∗ µ, i.e., no element is strictly preferable to itself.
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At the same time, the definition coincides with the generalized axiom of revealed preference
(GARP) on the revealed preference relation R∗ so that
µt R∗ µs implies not µs P µt. (4)
We use the definition in equation (4) to construct a statistical test in Section 4.
Mean acyclicity requires further comment. In particular, the condition applies to one
element cycles C =
{
(t, t)
}
. It follows that maximization of a locally nonsatiated utility
function requires that
∫
(pt · y)dµt(y) = mt, for all t ∈ T . Thus, the budget constraint
must be binding for every observed choice. An important practical implication of this fact
is that it is not crucial for the econometrician to observe income mt. Thus, given prices
pt and the distribution µt, the average expenditure must satisfy mt =
∫
(pt · y)dµt(y).
Mean acyclicity is a straightforward extension of GARP (as in Afriat, 1967; Diewert,
1973; Varian, 1982) to choices over probability measures, rather than consumption bun-
dles. In fact, if the consumer chooses only degenerate lotteries, GARP coincides with
mean acyclicity. To see this, for all t ∈ T a degenerate lottery satisfies µt = δxt , where
the latter denotes the Dirac measure concentrated at some xt ∈ RL+. Therefore, we have∫
(pt · y)dµs(y) = pt · xs for all t, s ∈ T , which reduces mean acyclicity to GARP.
Finally, by Lemma 11.45 in Aliprantis and Border (2006), we have∫
(p · y)dν(y) = p ·
∫
y dν(y)
for all ν ∈ ∆ and t ∈ T . This implies that all relevant information for mean acyclicity
is summarized by the mean bundle
∫
y dν(y) for the distribution ν. We leverage this
observation for the test in Section 4, where we exploit the fact that, when faced with
sampling error, estimating mean consumption rather than the whole distribution µt is
sufficient to test for mean acyclicity.
Since we can represent the budget set as a restriction on mean bundles, it is natural
to study utility functions that depend only on the mean bundle. We provide a formal
definition of a mean choice rationalization below.
Definition 2. We say the dataset DA is rationalizable with a mean choice model if there
is a locally nonsatiated function f : RL+ → R such that
U(ν) := f
(∫
y dν(y)
)
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rationalizes DA as in condition (2).
If the dataset can be rationalized with a mean choice model, then the utility that
rationalizes the data only depends on the mean bundle (a vector), rather than the whole
set of distributions. In the main theorem below, we argue that locally nonsatiated prefer-
ences are equivalent to the mean choice model when the sets of distributions are restricted
by the mean expenditure budget defined in equation (1).
Theorem 1. For any set of observations DA with mean expenditure budgets, the following
statements are equivalent:
(i) DA satisfies mean acyclicity.
(ii) DA is rationalizable with a locally nonsatiated utility function U : ∆ → R.
(iii) DA is rationalizable with a mean choice model.
(iv) DA is rationalizable with a mean choice model with a continuous, strictly increasing,
and concave function f : RL+ → R such that U(ν) := f
( ∫
y dν(y)
)
.
This result has several implications. First, the revealed preference analysis of sta-
tistical consumer theory is simple and parallels classical revealed preference analysis.
The main theorem shows this connection when consumer choices are restricted by mean
expenditures. However a more general statistical consumer theory is developed in Ap-
pendix A.2. Second, in the above framework, the mean choice model is observationally
equivalent to locally nonsatiated preferences. Therefore, this property of consumer pref-
erence has no additional testable implications. In fact, given statement (iv), there is no
loss of generality in restricting attention to a mean choice model with a well-behaved
function f . We emphasize that these equivalences depend on the assumptions imposed
on the observable budget sets and are not true in general, as shown in Section 2.2.
2.2 Alternative budgets
In the main analysis we focus attention on the mean expenditure budget. However, in
some settings it is natural to consider an alternative specification. Given the primitive
dataset D :=
{
(pt,mt, µt) : t ∈ T
}
, we consider support budgets defined by the mapping
B(p,m) :=
{
ν ∈ ∆ : ν
(
{y ∈ RL+ : p · y ≤ m}
)
= 1
}
, (5)
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for prices p ∈ RL++ and mean income m > 0. We call this a support budget since
ν is restricted to satisfy affordability for (almost) every realization. When using these
support budgets, we denote the corresponding dataset by DB =
{
(Bt, µt) : t ∈ T
}
where
Bt := B(pt,mt). Thus, we require for all t ∈ T that µt ∈ Bt.
This budget is more restrictive than the mean expenditure constraint considered pre-
viously. Recall that mean expenditure budget allows violations of p · y ≤ m with positive
probability, as long as the mean expenditure is bounded by m. We study the support
budget because it better matches the application of experimental studies on animal ra-
tionality. Experiments on animal rationality have each subject (e.g., capuchin monkey)
make choices from the same budget set several times. Repeated choices from a budget set
in an experiment then give a distribution of choices that can be used to study whether
data are consistent with the mean choice model, as in Definition 2.
Analogously to (2), a dataset DB =
{
(Bt, µt) : t ∈ T
}
is rationalizable by a utility
function U : ∆ → R if U(µt) ≥ U(ν), for all ν ∈ Bt and t ∈ T . Moreover, the set is
rationalizable with the mean choice model if U is specified as in Definition 2.
The revealed preference analysis of the mean choice model is similar with support
budgets. Consider the directly revealed preference relation R defined earlier. Notice that
even though the set of distributions available to the consumer differs, such a preference
relation is rationalizable with a mean choice model. For example, suppose that µt R µs,
or equivalently pt ·
∫
y dµs(y) ≤ mt, for some t, s ∈ T . The latter condition implies that
the mean bundle ȳµs :=
∫
y dµs(y) corresponding to the measure µs was affordable in
observation t. Therefore, it was possible for the individual to select a measure in Bt with
the same mean as µs, e.g., the Dirac measure δȳµs concentrated at the vector ȳµs . Hence,
for any mean choice model with the utility function U(ν) := f
( ∫
y dν(y)
)
, it must be
that µt R µs implies U(µt) ≥ U(δȳµs ) = U(µs). Note that this is true even when the
support of measure µs is not contained in
{
y ∈ RL+ : pt · y ≤ mt
}
.
Whenever the corresponding function f is locally nonsatiated, it must be that µt P µs
implies U(µt) > U(µs). Clearly, this suffices for the revealed preference relations R∗ and
P ∗ to be consistent with preference induced by any model of mean choice that rationalizes
the data DB with support budgets. We now arrive at the following proposition.
Proposition 1. For any set of observations DB with support budgets, the following state-
10
ments are equivalent:
(i) DB satisfies mean acyclicity.
(ii) DB is rationalizable with a mean choice model.
(iii) DB is rationalizable with a mean choice model with a continuous, strictly increasing,
and concave function f : RL+ → R such that U(ν) := f
( ∫
y dν(y)
)
.
That a mean choice model implies mean acyclicity follows from the argument above.
The other implications follow immediately from Theorem 1. Recall that Theorem 1 is
stated over mean expenditure budgets rather than support budgets. An important dis-
tinction is that with support budgets, the mean choice model is no longer observationally
equivalent to the general model with locally nonsatiated utility. Below is an example of a
dataset that is inconsistent with the mean choice model but is rationalizable by a locally
nonsatiated utility function. We discuss the testable restrictions for other assumptions
on preferences with support budgets in Appendix B.
Example 1. Let D =
{
(pt,mt, µt) : t = 1, 2
}
, with prices p1 = (2, 1), p2 = (1, 2) and
incomes m1 = m2 = 1. Moreover, suppose that measure µ1 assigns probability 1/4 to
vector (0, 1) and 3/4 to (1/2, 0), while distribution µ2 assigns probability 1/4 to point
(1, 0) and 3/4 to (0, 1/2). See Figure 1. Notice that the mean vectors corresponding
to µ1, µ2 are ȳµ1 = (3/8, 1/4) and ȳµ2 = (1/4, 3/8), respectively. In particular, since
p1 · ȳµ2 = p2 · ȳµ1 = 7/8 < 1, the set D violates mean acyclicity.
We show that despite this, the dataset can be rationalized by a locally nonsatiated
utility U : ∆ → R with support budgets. For example, consider the function U : ∆ → R
given by
U(ν) := min
{
sup
{
pt · y : y ∈ supp(ν)
}
: t = 1, 2
}
,
where supp(ν) denotes the support of measure ν. Indeed, it is locally nonsatiated in the
weak topology, while U(µ1) = U(µ2) = 1. At the same time, for any measure ν with the
support contained in
{
y ∈ R2+ : pt · y ≤ 1
}
, it must be that U(ν) ≤ 1 for t = 1, 2. Clearly,
this suffices for U to rationalize the corresponding set DB with support budgets.
To see that the above utility U does not rationalize the data with mean expenditure
budgets defined in (1), consider the distribution ν ′ that assigns probability 1/10 to (0, 2),
1/10 to (2, 0), and 8/10 to (1/8, 1/8). It follows that
∫
(pt · y)dν ′(y) = 9/10 < 1, for
11
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Figure 1: Graphical interpretation of the dataset in Example 1
t = 1, 2, so ν ′ is available for each mean budget. However, U(ν ′) = 4 which dominates µ1
and µ2 and is feasible for the respective budgets.
3 Comparison to random utility models
In this section we compare the mean choice model to random utility models. For a random
utility model, randomness arises because an individual’s preference is random. Thus, an
individual maximizes utility given a random draw of preferences on a standard budget
constraint. We follow the definitions of random utility models in McFadden and Richter
(1990), McFadden (2005), and Kitamura and Stoye (2018).
Recall that the budget in the standard deterministic consumer problem is given by
C(p,m) :=
{
y ∈ RL+ : p · y ≤ m
}
, (6)
for prices p ∈ RL++ and income m > 0. For brevity, we let Ct := C(pt,mt). The support
budget set described in equation (5) can also be written as
B(p,m) :=
{
ν ∈ ∆ : ν
(
C(p,m)
)
= 1
}
.
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Distributions of choices generated from random utility models will necessarily be included
in the support budget dataset DB =
{
(Bt, µt) : t ∈ T
}
since the individual maximizes
random preferences on each Ct.
We now formally describe random utility models. Let U be the space of strictly
quasiconcave locally nonsatiated utility functions u : RL+ → R. A set of observations D
is rationalized by a random utility model (RUM) if there is a probability measure ρ over
the space of functions U such that, for all t ∈ T :
µt(O) = ρ
({
ũ ∈ U : argmaxy∈Ct ũ(y) ∈ O
})
, (7)
for any measurable subset O ⊆ RL+, where the argmax set is a singleton since U consists
of strictly quasiconcave functions. In other words, the probability of choosing a bundle
in the set O is equal to the probability of drawing a utility function that is maximized
over Ct at some point in the set O. For a linear programming characterization of RUM
see McFadden and Richter (1990), McFadden (2005), and Kitamura and Stoye (2018).10
We show through examples that mean choice models neither nest nor are nested by
random utility models. In Example 2 we discuss a dataset that can be rationalized only
by a mean choice model. Here, there is no distribution over preferences that can generate
the observations. Despite this, the mean behavior is consistent with mean acyclicity. In
contrast, the dataset in Example 3 is only rationalizable by a RUM. Here, it is critical
that the distribution of goods are optimal for a given draw of utility but there are no
restrictions on aggregate behavior of the distribution. Thus, the model of mean choice
may be more appropriate for an individual whose behavior does not appear systematic
on day-to-day purchases, but who has consistent choices when studying, say, weekly
purchases from the same budget.
Example 2. Let a primitive dataset be given by D =
{
(p1,m1, µ1), (p2,m2, µ2)
}
, where
p1 = (2, 1), p2 = (1, 2), and m1 = m2 = 1. In addition, suppose that measure µ1 assigns
probability 7/12 to bundle (1/2, 0) and 5/12 to (0, 1), while µ2 assigns weight 7/12 to
(0, 1/2) and 5/12 to (1, 0). Clearly, both measures µ1, µ2 belong to the corresponding
support budgets B1, B2, respectively.
10There is also a condition called the axiom of revealed stochastic preferences given in McFadden and
Richter (1990) and McFadden (2005) that is more similar to GARP.
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Figure 2: Graphical interpretation of the dataset in Example 2.
Since both
∫
(p1 ·y)dµ2(y) and
∫
(p2 ·y)dµ1(y) are equal to 13/12 > 1 = m1 = m2, this
suffices for the set of observations to satisfy mean acyclicity and, thus, be rationalizable
by a mean choice model (by Proposition 1). Equivalently, the means of distributions µ1,
µ2 are given by ȳµ1 = (7/24, 5/12) and ȳµ2 = (5/12, 7/24), respectively, where p1 · ȳµ2 =
p2 · ȳµ1 = 13/12 > 1. See Figure 2 for a graphical interpretation.
In contrast, the data are inconsistent with the random utility model. Indeed, since
p1 · (0, 1/2) = 1/2 < m1, for a mass of at least 7/12 of utilities, bundle (0, 1/2) would
be strictly inferior to (1/2, 0). Analogously, as p2 · (1/2, 0) = 1/2 < m2, at least 7/12
of utilities would have to rank (0, 1/2) strictly over (1/2, 0). However, this would imply
that for a mass of at least 1/6 of all utilities we would have both u(1/2, 0) > u(0, 1/2)
and u(1/2, 0) < u(0, 1/2), which yields a contradiction.
Example 3. Consider the primitive dataset D =
{
(p1,m1, µ1), (p2,m2, µ2)
}
from Ex-
ample 1, where p1 = (2, 1), p2 = (1, 2), and m1 = m2 = 1; moreover, the measure µ1
assigns probability 1/2 to bundles (1/2, 0) and (1/4, 1/2), while µ2 assigns probability
1/2 to (0, 1/2) and (1/2, 1/4). Clearly, both measures µ1, µ2 belong to the corresponding
support budgets B1, B2, respectively. Recall Figure 1.
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As shown in Example 1, the dataset violates mean acyclicity. At the same time, it is
straightforward to show that the set of observations can be rationalized with a random
utility model. Clearly, one can always find a function u1 : R2+ → R in U that is uniquely
maximized at (1/2, 0) over C1 :=
{
y ∈ R2+ : p1 · y ≤ 1
}
and uniquely maximized at
(1/2, 1/4) over C2 :=
{
y ∈ R2+ : p2 ·y ≤ 1
}
. Analogously, there is a function u2 : R2+ → R
in U that is uniquely maximized at (0, 1/2) over C2 and uniquely maximized at (1/4, 1/2)
over C1. Therefore, a random utility model ρ that assigns probability 1/2 to each of these
utility functions rationalizes these data.
4 Testing mean acyclicity
The previous analysis describes the empirical content of mean choice models when the
distributions are known. However in many applications, the distribution µt is not known
perfectly. Instead, an analyst may see particular selected bundles, each interpreted as a
realized draw of consumption from the distribution µt. This section describes a method
of statistical inference that accommodates sampling variability arising from the fact that
the distribution given by µt is not known exactly.
4.1 The statistical test
The method of inference we present is designed for application to common datasets used
to test rationality of animals. This empirical setting has several features that simplify
testing relative to a more general setup. First, prices and income are known exactly, so
they do not need to be estimated. Second, there are several realized choices from each
budget, which allows us to use the central limit theorem to justify a normal approximation
of the means of the sampled distributions. Third, there are only two budgets (T = 2).11
This means there is a single cycle to consider when checking mean acyclicity. After
describing the test, we apply the methods to the data from Chen et al. (2006).
We now describe the test in detail. We assume an analyst observes a collection of nt
realizations {Y it}nti=1 corresponding to each observation t. These are treated as random
variables and we denote them in upper case. Each realization Y it is a vector of quantities,
11The methods of Hsieh et al. (2018) can be used for a statistical test with more than two budgets.
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i.e., Y it ∈ RL+. These realizations are draws from the distribution µt, which we interpret
as the actual choice. We interpret the population mean quantities E[Y it] as the mean of
the distribution µt described previously, so that E[Y it] =
∫
y dµt(y), for all t ∈ T .
When T = 2, as in our application, we write the null hypothesis of mean acyclicity as
H0 : p
s · E[Y it] ≤ ms implies pt · E[Y is] ≥ mt, for all t ̸= s in {1, 2}.
This is reformulation of condition (4), that uses the fact that
∫
(p ·y)dν(y) = p ·
∫
y dν(y).
The alternative hypothesis is
Ha : p
s · E[Y it] ≤ ms, for all t ̸= s in {1, 2}, with at least one inequality strict.
Recall that in the application, prices and income are measured without error, so we use
lower case letters to indicate that they are nonrandom.
We reject when sample averages are sufficiently far from the null. Formally, let
Y
t
:=
1
nt
nt∑
i=1
Y it.
First note that if Y
t
were nonrandom and equal to E[Y it], we could reject when
p1 · Y 2 ≤ m1 and p2 · Y 1 ≤ m2,
with at least one inequality strict. If we allow for sampling variability, the empirical
means may be different from the theoretical ones. Thus, we propose a test of the form
ϕ := 1
{
p1 · Y 2 ≤ m1 − σ̂2c√1−α; p2 · Y
1 ≤ m2 − σ̂1c√1−α
}
,
where 1{·} is the indicator function, ϕ = 1 denotes rejection, and ϕ = 0 denotes failure
to reject. We denote the nominal size of the test by α (e.g. 0.05), and let c√1−α be the
√
1 − α-quantile of the standard normal distribution. In addition,
σ̂1 :=
√√√√ 1
n1
n1∑
i=1
(
p2 · Y i1 − p2 · Y 1
)2
σ̂2 :=
√√√√ 1
n2
n2∑
i=1
(
p1 · Y i2 − p1 · Y 2
)2
,
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are sample analogue estimators of the standard deviation of p2·Y 1 and p1·Y 2, respectively.
The key assumption that justifies this test is that for t = 1, 2 there is a large number, nt,
of independent draws Y it from each distribution µt.
To provide some intuition behind this test, note that each inequality in the argument
of ϕ is motivated by a standard one-sided testing problem. Under the independence
assumption and some mild conditions, we have the large sample approximation
Prob
(
p1 · E[Y i2] ≤ p1 · Y 2 + σ̂2c√1−α
)
≈
√
1 − α.
Thus, on the event
p1 · Y
2 ≤ m1 − σ̂2c√1−α,
or equivalently
p1 · Y
2
+ σ̂2c√1−α ≤ m1,
we have strong evidence against
p1 · E[Y i2] ≥ m1.
A similar argument holds when testing the other inequality. Thus, when the test function
ϕ is 1, we have strong evidence against both inequalities
p1 · E[Y i2] ≥ m1 and p2 · E[Y i1] ≥ m2,
i.e., strong evidence against H0. The choice of c√1−α comes from the fact that we have
to reject two inequalities. In more detail, this threshold is motivated by
Prob
(
p1 · E[Y i2] ≤ p1 · Y 2 + σ̂2c√1−α ; p2 · E[Y i1] ≤ p2 · Y
1
+ σ̂1c√1−α
)
= Prob
(
p1 · E[Y i2] ≤ p1 · Y 2 + σ̂2c√1−α
)
Prob
(
p2 · E[Y i1] ≤ p2 · Y 1 + σ̂1c√1−α
)
≈
√
1 − α
√
1 − α = 1 − α,
where the first equality follows from the independence assumption.
We note that the test we propose is not consistent against alternatives in which one
of the inequalities is binding. That is, a configuration such as
p1 · E[Y i2] = m1 and p2 · E[Y i1] < m2
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violates the null, but is not reject with probability 1 as the sample size increases.12
There are a few other features of this test to point out. First, note that if a determin-
istic test (e.g. using Y
t
in place of E[Y it]) satisfies mean acyclicity, then the statistical
test fails to reject for any α < 0.75. This is because if α < 0.75 then c√1−α > c0.5 = 0.
One may not find the failure to reject an interesting way to differentiate between
datasets. Instead, one can compute the least nominal size α∗ under which the null is
rejected. To do this, one can compute the largest c∗√
1−α under which the test rejects the
data and then find the corresponding α∗. The construction of α∗ is related to a p-value
but is distinct because there are configurations consistent with the null hypothesis in
which rejection probabilities are not asymptotically equal to nominal size α.
High α∗ gives less evidence against the null. To see why this is the case, note that if
α∗ is high (α∗ > 0.75), then c√1−α∗ is negative. Thus, this requires the data to not only
satisfy mean acyclicity when failing to reject, but that the distance of the average bundles
must also be far away from rejecting. The closer the α∗ is to one, the lower the evidence
is against the null since this suggests the mean bundles are statistically far apart.
4.2 Application to Chen et al. (2006)
We apply the above procedure to the data on choices by capuchin monkeys that was
previously analyzed in Chen et al. (2006). We examine whether the capuchin monkeys
are rational according to standard rationality, random utility models, and mean choice
models. Thus, we check whether individuals satisfy the generalized axiom of revealed
preference, the axiom of revealed stochastic preference, and mean acyclicity.
The experiment was performed on three different capuchin monkeys. We refer to the
three subjects under their abbreviations: AG, FL, and NN. The consumption bundles
consisted of two goods: slices of apples and gelatin cubes or grapes (depending on the
subject). In the experiment, capuchin monkeys traded tokens for food items under two
different exchange rate regimes. In the first regime, one token could be exchanged for
12This suggests a potential power issue with the design of Chen et al. (2006), which is constructed
to detect violations of the compensated law of demand by pivoting the budget constraint. It is not a
deficiency of the test we present. Intuitively, the alternative hypothesis is on the boundary of the null
hypothesis, and so it is not possible to statistically distinguish it from nearby points in the null. One
may report the minimal nominal size (described below) as a way to describe evidence against the null
hypothesis.
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Subject
AG FL NN
Budget 1: p1 = (1, 1)
m1 12 12 12
n1 12 11 6
Ȳ 1 (6.08, 5.92) (5.64, 6.36) (5, 7)
Budget 2: p2 = (1/2, 1)
m2 9 10 10
n2 22 14 10
Ȳ 2 (9, 4.5) (13.86, 3.07) (12.8, 3.6)
GARP No No Yes
RUM Yes Yes Yes
Mean acyclicity Yes Yes Yes
α∗ 0.993 0.998 1.00
Table 1: Results of tests
one slice of apple or one gelatin cube/grape. In the second regime, two slices of apple
could be exchanged for one gelatin cube/grape. Per each subject, the data generated in
the experiment consisted of multiple choices from the two budget sets. For additional
information on the experiment, we refer the reader to Chen et al. (2006).
The details and results of the test are contained in Table 1. We note that two of the
three subjects from Chen et al. (2006) refute utility maximization, while all three subjects
could be described by a random utility model or a mean choice model. We note that all
monkeys satisfy mean acyclicity so the statistical test proposed earlier does not reject
for any α < 0.75. To better discern between the different datasets, we also report the
least nominal size α∗ that results in a rejection. We note that all α∗ computed are greater
than 0.99. Thus, there is weak evidence against the hypothesis that subjects satisfy mean
acyclicity.
5 Conclusion
This paper shows that models of deterministic stochastic choice can place strong restric-
tions on data and be taken to applications. In particular, if one constrains the distribution
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of bundles chosen to have mean expenditure less than income, then maximizing a general
utility function over distributions is observationally equivalent to a model of preferences
defined over mean consumption only. Thus, intuitive budget constraints greatly reduce
the class of deterministic stochastic choice models. In addition, we show how assump-
tions on the budget constraint crucially affect the interpretation of the revealed preference
analysis, and that this approach neither nests or is nested in the random utility model. Fi-
nally, we present a simple method of statistical inference for two budgets, which matches
the data from Chen et al. (2006) used in the illustrative example.
Overall, this paper highlights that there are often several intuitive mappings of prim-
itive datasets to budget sets that can greatly affect the analysis. For example, even
though the datasets with mean expenditure budgets DA and support budgets DB are
derived from the same primitive data, mean acyclicity is not equivalent to a general non-
satiated utility function of distributions when studying support budgets. An interesting
potential application would be to examine distributions of choices for different periods
of time (e.g. weekly, bi-weekly, monthly) using individual panel data such as that found
in Cherchye et al. (2017) and compare random utility models to mean choice models to
further examine the difference between these models of stochastic choice.
Appendix A Main proofs
Here we present proofs that were not included in the main body of the paper. Unless
stated otherwise, we follow the notation introduced in the paper.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
It is clear that (iv) ⇒ (iii) ⇒ (ii). From the main text we have shown (ii) ⇒ (i). It
remains to show (i) ⇒ (iv). Throughout this proof, define the function gt : ∆ → R by
gt(ν) :=
[∫
(pt · y)dν(y) −mt
]
,
for all t ∈ T . Clearly, since
∫
∥y∥dν(y) < ∞, for all ν ∈ ∆, by 11.45 in Aliprantis and
Border (2006), any such function gt is well-defined. Moreover, it is straightforward to
show that it is also continuous (with respect to the weak topology), strictly increasing
with respect to the first order stochastic dominance, and concave (in fact, linear).
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Mean acyclicity holds if and only if, for any cycle C =
{
(a, b), (b, c), . . . , (z, a)
}
in
T × T such that gt(µs) ≤ 0, for all (t, s) ∈ C, we have gt(µs) = 0, for all (t, s) ∈ C. By
Lemma 2 in Forges and Minelli (2009), there exist numbers {ϕt}t∈T and strictly positive
numbers {λt}t∈T such that ϕs ≤ ϕt + λtgt(µs), for all t, s ∈ T .
Take any such numbers {ϕt}t∈T , {λt}t∈T and define the function f : RL+ → R by
f(y) := min
{
ϕs + λs
[
ps · y −ms
]
: s ∈ T
}
,
which is continuous, strictly increasing, and concave. We claim that function U : ∆ → R,
given by U(ν) := f
( ∫
y dν(y)
)
, rationalizes the set of observations. Indeed, take any
t ∈ T and ν ∈ ∆ such that
∫
(pt · y)dν(y) ≤ mt, or equivalently gt(ν) ≤ 0. Then,
U(ν) = f
(∫
y dν(y)
)
= min
{
ϕs + λs
[
ps ·
∫
y dν(y) −ms
]
: s ∈ T
}
≤ ϕt + λt
[
pt ·
∫
y dν(y) −mt
]
= ϕt + λt
[∫
(pt · y)dν(y) −mt
]
= ϕt + λtgt(ν)
≤ ϕt
≤ min
{
ϕs + λsgs(µt) : s ∈ T
}
= min
{
ϕs + λs
[∫
(ps · y)dµt(y) −ms
]
: s ∈ T
}
= min
{
ϕs + λs
[
ps ·
∫
y dµt(y) −ms
]
: s ∈ T
}
= f
(∫
y dµt(y)
)
= U(µt),
where the first inequality follows from the property of the minimum function, the second
inequality is implied by λt > 0 and gt(ν) ≤ 0, while the third follows from the construction
of the numbers {ϕt}t∈T and {λt}t∈T .
It is straightforward to show that function U is strictly increasing in the sense of first
order stochastic dominance (see Appendix C). Thus, following Lemma C.4 presented in
Appendix C, the function U is locally nonsatiated.
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A.2 General statistical consumer theory
Theorem 1 can be extended to more general models of statistical choice. Here, a statistic
is a finite-dimensional summary of a distribution. In particular, let S : ∆ → RL be
a continuous function from the distribution of bundles to the L-dimensional real vector
space.13 As we require an additional monotonicity condition on S, we assume that it is
strictly increasing with respect to first order stochastic dominance.
We assume that the budget constraint for observation t ∈ T is represented by a
continuous function gt : Rk → R that is strictly increasing on Rk.14 Distribution ν ∈ ∆ is
feasible if gt
(
S(ν)
)
≤ 0. The dataset is given by DG =
{
(gt, µt) : t ∈ T
}
. Any variables
describing gt (such as prices) are absorbed into the function, as it is indexed by t.
Definition 3. The dataset DG with statistic S is rationalizable with a statistical choice
model if there is a locally nonsatiated function f : RL+ → R such that the function
U(ν) := f (S(ν))
rationalizes DG, i.e. if gt
(
S(ν)
)
≤ 0 then U(µt) ≥ U(ν), for all t ∈ T .
Similar to the mean expenditure constraint, we can define a direct revealed preference
relation RS by setting µ
tRSµ
s if gt(S(µs)) ≤ 0. Similarly, we can define a strictly directly
revealed preference relation PS so that µ
tPS µ
s if gt(S(µs)) < 0. Since the statistic S and
the budget constraint functions gt are assumed continuous, we can repeat the arguments
in the main text to show that these relations are consistent with a rationalization of the
choices by a locally nonsatiated function.
Similarly, we can take the transitive closure of RS, which must be consistent with the
utility function. For any t, s ∈ T , we say that µt is revealed preferred to µs, denoted by
µt R∗S µ
s, if there is a sequence of indices a, b, c, . . . , z ∈ T such that
µt RS µ
a, µa RS µ
b, . . . , and µz RS µ
s. (A1)
Moreover, we say that µt is strictly revealed preferred to µs, denoted by µt P ∗S µ
s, when
there is a sequence as in condition (A1) with at least one pair is ordered with P ∗S . From
this discussion, we consider the following acyclicity condition.
13More generally the statistic can map from ∆ into a space with dimension that is not equal to L.
14Function gt is strictly increasing when y′ℓ ≥ yℓ, for all ℓ = 1, . . . ,K, implies g(y′) ≥ g(y), for any
y, y′ ∈ RL, where the latter inequality is strict if y′ℓ > yℓ, for some ℓ = 1, . . . , L.
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Definition A.1 (Statistical acyclicity). For any cycle C =
{
(a, b), (b, c), . . . , (z, a)
}
in
T × T such that gt
(
S(µs)
)
≤ 0, for (t, s) ∈ C, we have gt
(
S(µs)
)
= 0, for all (t, s) ∈ C.
The above definition is equivalent to the revealed strict preference relation P ∗S be-
ing irreflexive. Equivalently, following the proof of Theorem 1, we see that statistical
acyclicity is necessary and sufficient for a statistical choice model.
Theorem A.1. For any set of observations DG, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) DG satisfies statistical acyclicity.
(ii) DG is rationalizable with a locally nonsatiated utility function U : ∆ → R.
(iii) DG is rationalizable with a statistical choice model.
(iv) DG is rationalizable with a statistical choice model with a continuous and strictly
increasing function f : RL+ → R such that U(ν) := f
(
S(ν)
)
.
Thus, while we presented the result for mean choice in Theorem 1 of the main body
of the paper, analogous result holds for any continuous statistic of the distribution of
bundles for restrictions enforced by the functions gt, for all t ∈ T .
Appendix B Alternative models
In this subsection we discuss the testable implications of three alternative models of
deliberately stochastic choice when the budget set is specified as
B(p,m) :=
{
ν ∈ ∆ : ν
(
{y ∈ RL+ : p · y ≤ m}
)
= 1
}
, (A2)
for prices p ∈ RL++ and income m ∈ R++. In particular, we look at the implications of
local nonsatiation and first order stochastic dominance.
We begin with the most general question concerning when the set of observations
DB :=
{
(Bt, µt) : t ∈ T
}
can be rationalized by a locally nonsatiated utility function
U : ∆ → R. Perhaps surprisingly, this model places no restrictions on choice behavior.
In contrast, when the utility U is strictly increasing with respect to first order stochastic
dominance (defined below), there are restrictions on behavior for the dataset DB.
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We again use the notation Ct :=
{
y ∈ RL+ : pt ·y ≤ mt
}
for the standard deterministic
budget constraint, with ∂Ct :=
{
y ∈ RL+ : pt · y = mt
}
corresponding to the budget
line, for all t ∈ T . Therefore, we have Bt =
{
ν ∈ ∆ : ν(Ct) = 1
}
, for all t ∈ T . Since
each set Bt consists of measures with their supports included in the compact set Ct, we
may restrict our attention to the space of probability measures with compact supports,
without loss of generality. Recall that the support of a probability measure ν is the
smallest (by set inclusion) closed set K such that ν(K) = 1.
B.1 Locally nonsatiated models
Here we determine the necessary and sufficient conditions under which a set of observa-
tions DB =
{
(Bt, µt) : t ∈ T
}
is rationalizable as in Section 2.2 with a locally nonsatiated
utility U : ∆ → R. Before we proceed, notice that each set Bt can be re-defined as
Bt =
{
ν ∈ ∆ : supp(ν) ⊆ Ct
}
,
where by supp(ν) we denote the support of ν.
Proposition B.1. Any set of observations DB is rationalizable with a locally nonsatiated
utility function U : ∆ → R.
Unlike the main analysis in Section 2 with the dataset DA, whenever choices of individ-
uals are limited to probability distributions over budget sets Bt, the locally nonsatiated
model has no testable implications. To see this define U : ∆ → R by
U(ν) :=
 0 if supp(ν) ⊆
∪
t∈T C
t,
sup
{
1 · y : y ∈ supp(ν)
}
otherwise;
where 1 denotes the unit vector. Since we focus on measures with compact supports, the
function is well-defined. Moreover, it trivially rationalizes the set of observations since
U(µt) = 0 for each t. To show that it is locally nonsatiated, take any measure ν and a
vector y ̸∈
∪
t∈T C
t such that y > z, for all z ∈ supp(ν). Given the compact support
of the measure, such a vector always exists. Consider now a sequence of measures {νk},
where νk := (1 − 1/k)ν + (1/k)δy, for all k, and where δy denotes the Dirac measure
concentrated at y. We see that the sequence {νk} converges to ν in the weak topology.
Since supp(νk) = supp(ν) ∪ {y}, we have U(νk) = 1 · y > U(ν), for all k.
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The above result follows from the fact that weak convergence of probability measures
does not imply convergence in their supports. In particular, for any measure ν with a
support contained in a budget set Ct, one can find a measure arbitrarily close to ν with
its support not contained in Ct. Because of this, choices reveal no information about the
strict preference over probability measures and the model has no testable implications.
B.2 Strictly monotone models
We now investigate the conditions under which a support budget dataset DB is rational-
izable as in (2) with a utility function U : ∆ → R that is strictly increasing with respect
to the first order stochastic dominance ⪰. More formally, for any µ, ν ∈ ∆, if µ ≻ ν then
U(µ) > U(ν). See Appendix C for a discussion on first order stochastic dominance.
The above framework allows for construction of a directly revealed preference relation
over observed choices {µt}t∈T , similar to the one in Section 2. We say that the measure
µt is directly revealed preferred to µs, and denote it by µt RF µ
s, whenever µs(Ct) = 1.
Equivalently, supp(µs) ⊆ Ct. Moreover, we define the strictly directly revealed preferred
relation as µt PF µ
s if µs(Ct) = 1 and µs(∂Ct) < 1. Therefore, we have µt PF µs when
µt RF µ
s and the support of µs is not contained in the corresponding budget line.
The above relation is weaker than the one defined in Section 2. Indeed, it is true that
µtRFµ
s (µtPFµ
s) implies
∫
(pt · y)dµs(y) ≤ (<) mt. However, since the above relation
requires the support of the measure µs to be contained in Ct, the converse is not true.
Moreover, it is clear that the weak relation RF is consistent with any utility function that
rationalizes the data. In the following lemma, we claim that PF is also consistent if U is
strictly increasing in the sense of first order stochastic dominance.
Lemma B.1. For any strictly increasing utility U : ∆ → R that rationalizes a set of
observations DB, it follows that for any t ∈ T , if ν
(
∂Ct
)
< ν
(
Ct
)
= 1 then U(µt) > U(ν).
Proof. Take any probability measure ν ∈ ∆ with ν
(
∂Ct
)
< ν
(
Ct
)
= 1. From Lemma C.1,
there is a probability space (Ω,F , τ) and random variable X : Ω → RL+ such that
ν(O) = τ
({
ω ∈ Ω : X(ω) ∈ O
})
,
for any measurable set O ⊆ RL+. Given the assumption imposed on the probability
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measure ν, there is a set Ω′ ⊆ Ω that satisfies
τ
({
ω ∈ Ω′ : pt ·X(ω) < mt
})
> 0.
Take any random variable X ′ : Ω → RL+ such that pt · X ′(ω) ≤ mt and X ′(ω) ≥ X(ω),
for all ω ∈ Ω, and X ′(ω) > X(ω), for some ω ∈ Ω′ which clearly exists.15 Define measure
ν ′(O) := τ
({
ω ∈ Ω : X ′(ω) ∈ O
})
,
for all measurable sets O ⊆ RL+. By Lemma C.1 in Appendix C, we have ν ′ ≻ ν.
Given that the function U is strictly increasing in the first order stochastic sense, while
ν ′(Ct) = 1, we obtain U(µt) ≥ U(ν ′) > U(ν) which concludes the proof.
As in the main body of the paper, we denote the transitive closure of RF by R
∗
F .
Therefore, we have µt R∗F µ
s if there is a sequence of indices a, b, c, . . . , z ∈ T such that
µt RF µ
a, µa RF µ
b, . . . , and µz RF µ
s.
Moreover, the relation is strict, or µt P ∗F µ
s, if at least one comparison is strictly directly
revealed preferred. Lemma B.1 leads to the following acyclicity condition.
Definition B.1 (F-acyclicity). For any cycle C =
{
(a, b), (b, c), . . . , (y, z)
}
in T ×T such
that µs(Ct) = 1, for all (t, s) ∈ C, we have µs(∂Ct) = 1, for all (t, s) ∈ C.
Equivalently, the revealed strict preference relation P ∗F is irreflexive. We now prove
that F-acyclicity is also sufficient for a dataset DB to be rationalizable with a strictly
increasing utility function U . We summarize this result in the following proposition.
Proposition B.2. For any set of observations DB with support budgets, the following
statements are equivalent:
(i) DB satisfies F-acyclicity.
(ii) DB rationalizable with a utility function U : ∆ → R that is strictly increasing in the
sense of first order stochastic dominance.
(iii) DB rationalizable with a utility function U : ∆ → R that is strictly increasing in the
sense of first order stochastic dominance, continuous, and concave.
15For example, take any ℓ = 1, . . . , L and define X ′(ω) := X(ω) + 1
ptℓ
[
mt − pt · X(ω)
]
eℓ, where eℓ
denotes the ℓth basis vector, i.e., an element of RL with the ℓ-th entry equal to one and all others equal
to zero.
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Proof. Clearly (iii) ⇒ (ii) ⇒ (i) from the arguments in the text. We show (i) ⇒ (iii)
constructively. First, take any number β such that
β > max
{
−
∫
Ct
(pt · y −mt)dµs(y)∫
RL+\Ct
(pt · y −mt)dµs(y)
: µs
(
RL+ \ Ct
)
> 0 and t, s ∈ T
}
.
For every t ∈ T define a function ft : RL+ → R by
f t(y) :=
 (pt · y −mt) if y ∈ Ct,β(pt · y −mt) otherwise;
which is continuous and strictly increasing.
Define the function gt : ∆ → R by gt(ν) :=
∫
f t(y)dν(y), which is continuous, concave,
and strictly increasing in the sense of first order stochastic dominance. Moreover for all
s ∈ T , we have gt(µs) ≤ 0 if and only if µs(Ct) = 1. Indeed, if µs(Ct) = 1 then
gt(µs) =
∫
f t(y)dµs(y) =
∫
Ct
f t(y)dµs(y) +
∫
RL+\Ct
f t(y)dµs(y)
=
∫
Ct
f t(y)dµs(y) =
∫
Ct
(pt · y −mt)dµs(y) ≤ 0.
To show the converse, suppose that µs
(
RL+ \ Ct
)
> 0. Then:
gt(µs) =
∫
f t(y)dµs(y)
=
∫
Ct
f t(y)dµs(y) +
∫
RL+\Ct
f t(y)dµs(y)
=
∫
Ct
(pt · y −mt)dµs(y) + β
∫
RL+\Ct
(pt · y −mt)dµs(y)
>
∫
Ct
(pt · y −mt)dµs(y) −
∫
Ct
(pt · y −mt)dµs(y)
= 0,
where the strict inequality follows from the choice of β.
The above observation implies that DB satisfies F-acyclicity if and only if, for any cycle
C =
{
(a, b), (b, c), . . . , (z, a)
}
in T × T such that gt(µs) ≤ 0, for all (t, s) ∈ C, it must
be that gt(µs) = 0, for all (t, s) ∈ C. Following Lemma 2 in Forges and Minelli (2009),
there exist numbers {ϕt}t∈T , {λt}t∈T such that ϕs ≤ ϕt + λtgt(µs), for all t, s ∈ T , where
λt > 0, for all t ∈ T . Given that ν(Ct) = 1 implies gt(ν) ≤ 0, for any measure ν ∈ ∆, one
can show that the function U : ∆ → R defined as U(ν) := min
{
ϕs + λsgs(ν) : s ∈ T
}
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rationalizes the set of observations by arguments that mimic the proof of Theorem 1.
Moreover, by the properties of functions gt, it is also continuous, strictly increasing in
the sense of first order stochastic dominance, and concave.
Clearly, the model of consumer choice discussed in Section 2.2 is a special case of the
model that satisfies strict monotonicity in the sense of first order stochastic dominance.
Indeed, given a dataset DB it is easy to show that mean acyclicity implies F-acyclicity.
However, unlike the model introduced in Section 2.2 (which neither nests nor is nested by
random utility models), the strictly monotone model is a generalization of random utility
models (McFadden and Richter, 1990). However, there are strictly monotone models that
are not rationalized by random utility models (recall Example 2).
Proposition B.3. If a dataset DB is rationalized by a random utility model as described
in (7), then there is a utility function U : ∆ → R that is strictly monotone in the sense
of first order stochastic dominance and rationalizes DB.
Proof. We prove the result by showing that whenever a dataset DB violates F-acyclicity
then it can not be rationalized with a random utility model. Suppose there is some cycle
C =
{
(a, b), (b, c), . . . , (z, a)
}
such that µs(Ct) = 1, for all (t, s) ∈ C, and µs(∂Ct) < 1, for
some (t, s) ∈ C. For any probability measure ρ as in (7), this implies that the measure
of utilities ũ such that maxy∈Ct ũ(y) ≥ maxy∈Cs ũ(y) is equal to one, for all (t, s) ∈ C.
Moreover, there is a set of non-zero measure of utilities for which the inequality is strict,
for some (t, s) ∈ C. However, this implies that there is a non-zero measure set of utilities
ũ that induce a strict cycle, which yields a contradiction.
Appendix C First order stochastic dominance
In this section we discuss properties of the first order stochastic dominance. Let ∆X
denote a Borel space of probability distributions over some X ⊆ RL. We consider the
usual partial order over RL, i.e., for x, y ∈ X ⊆ RL, x ≥ y if and only if xi ≥ yi for each
ℓ = 1, . . . , L. Distribution µ first order stochastically dominates ν, or µ ⪰ ν, whenever∫
fdµ ≥
∫
fdν, for any measurable, bounded, and nondecreasing function f : X → R.
One can show that ⪰ is a partial order over ∆X . This follows from Theorem 2 in
Kamae and Krengel (1978) and the fact that RL is a Polish space.
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Lemma C.1. Suppose that µ ⪰ ν, for some µ, ν ∈ ∆X . There is a probability space
(Ω,F , τ) and random variables Xµ, Xν : Ω → X such that
(i) Xµ and Xν are distributed according to µ and ν respectively, i.e., for any Borel
measurable set O ⊆ X we have
µ(O) = τ
({
ω ∈ Ω : Xµ(ω) ∈ O
})
and ν(O) = τ
({
ω ∈ Ω : Xν(ω) ∈ O
})
;
(ii) Xµ(ω) ≥ Xν(ω), for all ω ∈ Ω.
See Lemma 4 in Kamae and Krengel (1978) for the proof. Using Lemma C.1, we say
that µ ≻ ν when µ ⪰ ν, µ ̸= ν, and there exists a measurable set F ⊆ Ω such that for all
ω ∈ F we have Xµ(ω) > Xν(ω). We now prove a series of lemmas.
Lemma C.2. The distribution µ first order stochastically dominates ν, or µ ⪰ ν, if and
only if µ(D) ≥ ν(D), for any measurable and upward comprehensive set D.16
Proof. We prove the implication (⇒) by contradiction. Suppose that µ ⪰ ν, but there is
some measurable, upward comprehensive set D such that µ(D) < ν(D). Let χD be the
indicator function, taking values χD(x) = 0, for x /∈ D, and χD(x) = 1 otherwise. The
function is obviously bounded. Since D is upward comprehensive, the above function is
increasing. Since the simple function is defined on a measurable set, it is measurable.
However, it must be that
∫
χDdµ = µ(D) < ν(D) =
∫
χDdν, which contradicts that µ
first order stochastic dominates ν.
The converse follows directly from the definition of Lebesgue integration. Suppose
that, for any upward comprehensive and measurable set D, we have µ(D) ≥ ν(D).
Clearly, D is upward comprehensive if and only if its complement RL \ D is downward
comprehensive. Thus, for any such set E, we have µ(E) ≤ ν(E).
Take any bounded, measurable, and increasing function f : RL → R. Clearly, for all
r ∈ R any sets of the form
{
y ∈ RL : f(y) > r
}
and
{
y ∈ RL : f(y) < r
}
are upward
and downward comprehensive, respectively. Moreover, they are both measurable, by
16Set D ⊂ RL is upward (downward) comprehensive if y ∈ D and x ≥ (≤) y implies x ∈ D.
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measurability of f . This implies that∫
fdµ =
∫ ∞
0
µ
({
y ∈ RL : f(y) > r
})
dr −
∫ ∞
0
µ
({
y ∈ RL : f(y) < r
})
dr
≥
∫ ∞
0
ν
({
y ∈ RL : f(y) > r
})
dr −
∫ ∞
0
ν
({
y ∈ RL : f(y) < r
})
dr
=
∫
fdν.
Since this is true for any increasing function f , the proof is complete.
Before we state the next result, a function f : X → R is strictly increasing if y′ℓ ≥ yℓ,
for all ℓ = 1, . . . , L, and y′ℓ > yℓ, for some ℓ, implies f(y
′) > f(y), for any y, y′ ∈ X.
Lemma C.3. Suppose that µ ≻ ν, for some µ, ν ∈ ∆X . For any strictly increasing
function f : X → R, we have
∫
fdν >
∫
fdµ.
Proof. Given that ν ⪰ µ, Lemma C.1 implies that there is a probability space (Ω,F , τ)
and random variables Xµ, Xν : Ω → X that are distributed according to µ, ν respectively,
and Xµ(ω) ≥ Xν(ω), for all ω ∈ Ω. Since µ ≻ ν, let Ω′ ⊆ Ω be defined so that
Ω′ =
{
ω ∈ Ω : Xµ(ω) > Xν(ω)
}
.
where τ(Ω′) > 0 (recall Lemma C.1). For any strictly increasing f : X → R, we have∫
fdν −
∫
fdµ =
∫
Ω
[
f
(
Xν(ω)
)
− f
(
Xµ(ω)
)]
dτ(ω)
=
∫
Ω′
[
f
(
Xν(ω)
)
− f
(
Xµ(ω)
)]
dτ(ω) > 0.
This competes the proof.
Lemma C.4. Suppose that X + RL+ ⊆ X. For any measure µ ∈ ∆X and neighborhood,
we have ν ≻ µ, for some ν in the neighborhood.
Proof. We show that for any µ ∈ ∆ there is a sequence {µk} in ∆ that weakly converges
to µ and µk ≻ µ, for all k. Take any probability space (Ω,F , τ) and the random variable
Xµ : Ω → X that is distributed according to µ, i.e., for any measurable O ⊆ X we have
µ(O) = τ
({
ω ∈ Ω : Xµ(ω) ∈ O
})
.
Take any sequence {Xk} of random variables Xk : Ω → R that pointwise converge to Xµ
and satisfy Xk(ω) > Xµ(ω), for all ω ∈ Ω.
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For each k, define a probability measure µk so that for any measurable O ⊆ X
µk(O) := τ
({
ω ∈ Ω : Xk(ω) ∈ O
})
.
Since X + RL+ ⊆ X, we have µk ∈ ∆X . Moreover, for any measurable, upward compre-
hensive set D, it must be that
µk(D) = τ
({
ω ∈ Ω : Xk(ω) ∈ D
})
≥ τ
({
ω ∈ Ω : Xµ(ω) ∈ D
})
= µ(D),
since for all ω ∈ Ω if Xµ(ω) ∈ A then Xk(ω) ∈ D. Therefore, by Lemma C.2 and
since Xk(ω) > Xµ(ω), for all ω ∈ Ω, it follows for all k that µk ≻ µ. Finally, take any
continuous, bounded function f : X → R and notice that
lim
k→∞
∣∣∣∣∫ fdµk − ∫ fdµ∣∣∣∣ = limk→∞
∣∣∣∣∫ [f(Xk(ω))− f(Xµ(ω))]dτ(ω)∣∣∣∣ = 0,
since Xk(ω) → Xµ(ω), for all ω ∈ Ω. Thus {µk} weakly converges to µ. Clearly, this
implies that, for any neighborhood around µ, there is some µk in the neighborhood such
that µk ≻ µ.
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